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HOT SPOTS IN THE LEGISLATIVE CLIMATE
CHANGE PROPOSALS
Carol M. Rose ∗
Victor Flatt’s “Legislative Temperature” on climate change provides a
useful typology of the proposals now under consideration in the U.S. Congress. 1 Professor Flatt ultimately leaves it to us to decide which proposal is
“best.” But by tacit consensus, our legislators have already decided one
element of the “best” legislation: it will include some version of marketbased regulation (“MBR”), in the form of cap-and-trade programs or even
(gasp!) taxes. 2 As Professor Flatt suggests, this development could hardly
have been predicted from previous pollution control legislation, which generally adopted various kinds of command-and-control regulation. 3
What happened? Professor Flatt attributes the congressional change of
heart to the apparent success of the one notable exception to command-andcontrol regulation; that was the effort to reduce acid rain through a cap-andtrade regime for sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions under the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990. 4 But Congress instituted the acid rain MBR only after a long and increasingly expensive slog through command-and-control
regulation. Indeed, cap-and-trade was to act as a kind of relief from the
growing costs of pollution abatement through command-and-control methods. 5 This is a typical progression of legislative form; in other areas as
well, like controlling overfishing, resource economists have noted that sophisticated MBRs only arrive after more cumbersome regulatory regimes
have shown their limitations. 6
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So, once again, why does Congress prefer MBRs for this issue of
greenhouse gas control, without experimenting with other kinds of regulation first? Professor Flatt is undoubtedly right that the early introduction of
MBRs to address this new issue reflects a dose of environmental learning—
especially learning about the cost-saving capacity of MBRs like cap-andtrade programs. Indeed, the word on the street has been that the U.S. business community would not accept greenhouse gas controls in the absence of
cap-and-trade. 7
But a few other factors may be at work as well, particularly the characteristics of the chief global warming pollutant, carbon dioxide (CO2). As
Professor Flatt notes, CO2 effectively takes the gas out of many of the major
objections to MBRs. 8 The naggers (of whom I have been one) have always
complained about hotspots in cap-and-trade regimes, and about the inappropriateness of trading complex and non-fungible resources like wetlands
and habitat. 9 But CO2 floats to the upper atmosphere and mixes around, no
matter who produces it or where it is produced, creating no hotspots or any
other kind of nonfungibility. It persists in the atmosphere, too, so it does
not even matter when it is produced. Any batch of CO2 can be traded for
any other, from any time, from or to any place. Besides that, on the moral
front, it is hard to make devils out of CO2 producers. The stuff is not poison, after all, and it does not give anyone heart attacks or cancer, like the
other big air pollutants. Our current climate dilemma feels more like the
situation that occurs when too many people in a room make the whole place
too hot. Yes, it is awful, but whose fault is that? So why not allow trading,
if trading helps cool the place off?
But the current legislative proposals have another and even bigger surprise for careful observers. The surprise is not just that these proposals
showcase MBRs; it is that they plan to make emitters pay, right off the bat.
Thomas Merrill, taking a leaf from Gary Libecap, observes that marketbased regimes may make a lot of sense overall, but that they usually are derailed politically unless the potential losers get paid off. 10 That is to say,
distributional concerns—who wins and who loses—too often trump efficiency in the sense of the greatest good for the greatest number. What this
7
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See Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 296–97 (describing Gary Libecap’s view that more efficient management regimes still require payoffs to those who
did well in old system).

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/4/

190

102:189 (2008)

Hot Spots

has meant for U.S. environmental policy is (1) a paltry number of MBRs,
and (2) those MBRs taking the form of cap-and-trade rather than tax, with
(3) the old emitters getting a free pass, more or less, through a gracious
helping of grandfathered free emission rights. 11
That is why the new climate proposals are such a surprise. Not only do
their proponents call for market-oriented controls right from the start, but
some of them are talking about cap-and-trade rights being allocated by auction instead of grandfathering, and at least one, Representative John Dingell
(D., Mich.), has floated the idea of a (gasp again!) tax instead of cap-andtrade. Both auctions and taxes would have the unprecedented effect of putting money in the public treasury instead of the old emitters’ pockets, and
there are plenty of ideas about how to spend it. 12 Moreover, the greenhouse
gas proposals have revived a mini-debate about the relative merits of emission taxes as opposed to cap-and-trade. 13 Economists on the whole like
taxes better than cap-and-trade, at least for greenhouse gases, chiefly because they think taxes would be less complicated administratively and because taxes could avoid the price volatility that might accompany cap-andtrade. 14
But no one cared all that much about economists’ preferences in the
past; why should they matter now? 15 A cynical possibility is that Representative Dingell now proposes a carbon tax while continuing to believe, as he
has said in the past, that a greenhouse gas tax would be so unpopular that
the American public would never tolerate it. 16 If that is the case, then proposing a tax is just a ploy to make us forget about the whole thing and go
back to driving around in the Detroit cars so dear to Representative Dingell’s heart. 17 This ruse would be Machiavellian, but it might be too sim11
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110th Cong. 11–12 (Nov. 1, 2007) (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office) (suggesting that proceeds from government sale of allowances could be used to alleviate economic
dislocations from higher costs of emissions, or to reduce the deficit, or to lower corporate taxes, or to
make lump-sum payments to households) [hereinafter Cost of Controlling Carbon Emissions].
13
See Amena H. Saiyid, Congressional Budget Office Says Carbon Tax Preferable to Cap-andTrade Regime, [2007] Daily Env’t Rpt. (BNA) No. 212 (Nov. 2), at A-2 (describing debate between
several members of the Congressional Budget Office and the Natural Resources Defense Council’s David Doniger over carbon tax versus cap-and-trade).
14
Id.; see also Cost of Controlling Carbon Emissions, supra note 12, at 4–5 (describing these and
other advantages of tax over cap-and-trade); Dean Scott, Congressional Economist Says Carbon Tax
More Efficient than Cap-and-Trade Effort, [2006] Daily Env’t Rpt. (BNA) No. 59 (March 28), at A-5;
cf. Robert Hahn & Peter Passell, Time to Change U.S. Climate Policy, 4 The Economists’ Voice, iss. 5,
art. 2 (2007), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss5/art2 (link), (arguing for cap and trade
over tax on grounds of political feasibility).
15
See Merrill, supra note 10, at 281–89 (observing paucity of market-based regulation and dominance of distributional concerns over efficiency in past environmental legislation).
16
David Leonhardt, What is John Dingell Really Up To?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2007, at C1.
17
Id.
12

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/4/

191

NO RTHW ESTERN U NIVERSITY LAW REVIEW CO LLOQUY

ple-minded for a political pro like Representative Dingell. Perhaps another
factor is at work: Representative Dingell knows that pain is on the way for
the auto industry, and a tax will help to share the pain with some other big
emitters, notably the oil industry and the utilities—or possibly even shift a
bit more of the pain to them. I do not mean to present Representative Dingell as the bad guy; for the moment, he is the good guy for floating the politically radical idea of carbon taxes, whatever his motives. But the chief
reason why these polluter-pay proposals now seem feasible may be that so
many entities are involved in greenhouse gases that no single interest group
can dominate the discussion, opening things up for ideas that economists
like, especially taxes.
Nevertheless, most of the proposals are for cap-and-trade rather than
emission or carbon taxes, and there are some other political reasons for this.
The most obvious reason is self-seeking on the part of current emitters.
Unlike taxes, cap-and-trade emission entitlements are easy to grandfather to
the polluting entities themselves, and this feature makes cap-and-trade attractive to those entities and their lobbyists. 18 But other reasons are not necessarily self-seeking. For one thing, we already have experience with capand-trade, from our own SO2 program and from Europe and Japan’s more
recent but somewhat messy experience with greenhouse gas emission
trades. 19 For another, a U.S. cap and trade program would help American
firms to make connections with those other countries’ existing programs,
and also to take credit for any voluntary reductions they already made while
waiting for the U.S. to catch up. 20 For still another, there are some important global distributional questions that are tricky to address with taxes. As
the economists have noted, the best tax would be uniform throughout the
world, to prevent the “leakage” problem that occurs when firms relocate to
low- or no-tax jurisdictions. 21 The trouble with this desideratum is that it
requires less developed countries (LDCs) to agree to a tax that puts their
new industries in the same boat with those of the United States and Europe—a dim prospect, given the LDCs’ fervent opposition. 22 A cap-and18
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trade program, on the other hand, can grant LDCs some extra allowances or
a higher baseline, with the effect that U.S. and European industries will buy
up some of their allowances, effectively paying them to use cleaner technology or plant trees. 23
Payoffs to LDCs bring up another issue between these two MBR approaches. One big lesson of the U.S. acid rain program is that trade allows
substitute performance. Where costs differ as between different players,
substitute performance can save a lot of money. Trade effectively gives an
emitting entity a third option: in addition to (1) fixing the problem with better technology or less activity, or (2) paying the cost of emissions (by buying rights or paying taxes), (3) it can also pay somebody else to fix emission
problems more cheaply in some other plant. This additional choice is obvious with cap-and-trade, but taxes can have the same third option if they add
a gimmick: tax credits for substitute performance or “offsets.” 24 Either
way, the emitter can save on compliance costs, while the substitute performer gets paid to cut back on emissions. On the whole, LDCs offer CO2
emitters a lot of chances for cutting costs through substitute performance
while providing the LDCs with some benefits too; European or American
firms could more easily install new technology in the LDCs’ new plants
than in their own old ones, or they could buy up conservation easements as
offsets, encouraging LDCs to halt old growth forest burnoff and coincidentally preserve importantly biodiverse habitats.
But wait! Conserving old growth forests doesn’t count! The Kyoto
Protocol does not allow credits for them, thanks in large part to the Europeans, who have few forested areas themselves and who are notoriously tightfisted about giving credit for any kind of forestry projects. 25 To be sure,
old-growth credits might help damp down the forest flames that now pour
CO2 into the air around the equator, and to be sure, old-growth forestry conservation would yield a two-for-one payoff in habitat conservation. But
alas, conserving existing forests is not “additional” enough. 26 And besides,
the gas-slurping Americans might get away with something undeserved if
23
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COUNTRIES IN THE KYOTO PERIOD AND THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF SEQUESTRATION IN POST-KYOTO
AGREEMENTS
31
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at
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Trading in Ecosystem Services: Carbon Sinks and the Clean Development Mechanism, 22 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 623, 630 (2007) (describing Kyoto requirement of additionality).
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they can just pay for trees instead of cleaning up their act. 27
Fortunately, resistance toward forestry credits appears to have softened
in the recent Bali discussions of post-Kyoto measures. 28 But there has always been more to forestry offset concerns than mere jealous pouting. Offsets of any kind can generate big savings, but they also call forth “The
Revenge of the Naggers.” As Professor Flatt observes, offsets in general
raise a multitude of questions: Just what can be substituted for what? Are
all these offsets really fungible? And can you monitor them? 29 Sure, CO2
here can trade for CO2 there—it is all the same. But what about CO2 for
methane? Methane is harder to measure, so how does that factor into the
equation? 30 Rough equivalents may be all that can hoped for, but how
rough is too rough? Forests may be the most problematic of all, because
each forest can be very different from others, and the contribution of each to
climate control is very hard to assess. Tropical rainforests might be fine,
but as Professor Flatt points out, boreal forests may do more harm than
good in global warming. 31 To be sure, they absorb CO2, but they are just
too green, absorbing too much heat in places that would otherwise be
snowy white and reflect the suns rays back into the atmosphere. Brandon
Scarborough, writing for the Property and Environment Research Center, an
outfit that generally reveres markets and property rights, thinks that forestry
entitlements are not going to work as offsets, because they are too variable
and too complicated. 32 I think this is wrongheaded; some allowances (at
least for tropical rainforests) will do a lot of good, both to reduce deforestation and to get LDCs on board with any plan. But in the realm of offsets,
the naggers’ questions are still important ones, both about measurement and
about fungibility.
In the final analysis, as Professor Flatt emphasizes, MBR methods are
not a be-all and end-all for climate change control. 33 We have a long history
of command-and-control regulation, and we have had many important successes with it. 34 Aside from that, as Professor Flatt points out, a lot of
27
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29
See Flatt, supra note 1, at 143.
30
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ways).
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See Flatt, supra note 1, at 143.
32
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REV. 83 (praising command and control regulation based on specific technology).
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Americans seem to prefer command-and-control regulation to MBRs. 35
Professor Flatt suggests vehicle energy standards as a candidate for continued regulation of a more traditional dirigiste type. 36 I am unsure about that
particular application, but it is clear that MBRs are not for everything. Resources for the Future researcher Dallas Burtraw, who has advocated MBR
ideas for a long time, draws the line along the axis of monitoring. 37 MBR
approaches will only work on the kinds of resources and resource uses that
we can monitor. That is true of cap-and-trade, and it is true of taxes too.
Unless we know what is going in and coming out, we simply cannot use
property rights or taxing regimes effectively; they will unravel in a great
heap once the first cheaters give license to the others to relax their own
compliance. But with monitoring (and of course enforcement), MBRs have
a chance, and the cheaper and the more effective the monitoring, the better
that chance is. Failing the possibility of adequate monitoring, however, the
only option is to fall back on more traditional regulation, insisting on particular technology.
The bottom line is that MBR approaches are, after all, market-based
regulation, and they require competent governmental supervision, even if
nothing more than monitoring and enforcement. MBR approaches in the
environment are a fancy form of a property right, and like many other kinds
of property, they offer opportunities for efficient resource management and
mutually beneficial trades. But in the end, even fancy property needs good
cops.
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